US Fiscal & Fed Risks, Myanmar’s Rare-Earth Shift, & Lithium Market Slump
MARKETS UPDATE
BUDGET & FED SPARK NORTH AMERICAN MINING RALLY; AUSSIE TAXES WEIGH
US politicians are doing their worst to dismantle the foundations of the fiscal and monetary system and replace them with something even more political. On the budgetary side, GOP legislators are setting a precedent to tinker with the deficit by hiding its real cost. The cult of ‘money for nothing’ is also creeping into FOMC, where politics is pushing for cuts even before we understand the full inflationary impact of tariffs. But fiscal profligacy and addiction to cheap credit are not the unique prerogative of rightwing populists. In the city’s mayoral primary, New Yorkers have just backed a leftist freshwater sailor who happily proclaimed: “Vote for me, and everything will be for free.” Lemmings from Queens to Brooklyn did just that. Unimpressed, critical minerals stocks bifurcated this week with strong performance in North America and tax-related selling in wombat land. Regardless, they had the best quarter in years. Chinese stocks? Irrelevant. They are being propped up by top officials chanting, "let hundred Deep Seeks bloom." Sad, but what else can you do when your boss is sitting under house arrest? (1)
GEOPOLITICAL INSIGHTS
CHINA'S RARE EARTH IMPORTS FROM MYANMAR RESUME
Politics has turned its greedy gaze towards critical minerals in Greenland, Ukraine, and the DRC. But for the sake of rare earths, it should become a bit more interested in Myanmar.
Yes, Myanmar. Until very recently, Myanmar plus rare earths equaled Kachin. Well, not anymore.
Kachin is Myanmar’s northernmost state. To the east lies Yunnan. Both regions were traditionally inhabited by various hill tribes organized in chiefdoms. Early forms of statehood, although sporadic, were more prevalent in the East (e.g., the Dali Kingdom). The British attitude to these regions was not unlike that of other mountainous polities around India – relying on pre-existing power networks and leaving the locals with wide-ranging autonomy. This tradition was to clash with nascent Burmese nationalism. In 1948, Kachin State was formed out of the former British Burma’s civil districts of southern Bhamo and central Myitkyina – both of which are the centers of rare earths production today. To form “Kachin,” they were added to a larger northern district of Puta-o further north, which is less relevant to our story.
After the civilian government collapsed in 1957, tensions between the Kachin and Rangoon's central authorities intensified, leading to the formation of the Kachin Independence Army (KIA) in 1961. As in neighboring Malaysia and Indochina, Maoists infiltrated the region, leading to splits within KIA. In the late 1980s, when both Rangoon and Beijing were convulsed by political unrest, the communist organization collapsed, splintering into various regional groupings. In Kachin, it was transformed into Democratic Party Kachin (NDA-K), which controlled the vital border region with the PRC, including the township of Chipwe and the border town of Pangwa, both in Myitkyina district.
Partial economic liberalization in China soon began to influence the region's economy. In the 1990s, timber began to flow eastwards, particularly teak. Gold and gemstone mining followed, and so did opium. Roads were upgraded to facilitate resource extraction by Chinese companies. Since around 2005, the production of rare earths from ionic adsorption clays also began to flourish here. The clays had one valuable characteristic—they were rich in heavy rare earths.
Meanwhile, Myanmar's military lured local insurgent groups into its centrally controlled Border Guard Force (BGF), but the KIA refused—and armed clashes reignited in 2011. By contrast, the post-communist NDA-K joined the BGF and retained authority over its raw-material exports to the PRC. Owing to its control over resource-rich borderlands and its ability to manage relationships with the Myanmar Army and state officials, NDA-K became an ideal business partner for Chinese companies.
China desperately needed this link. Following a series of environmental crackdowns between 2011 and 2016, it became much more challenging to leach ionic clays in the PRC. The crackdown left oxide separators with hungry plants looking for feedstock. For Kachin’s borderlands, it was a boon. While mines in Yunnan accounted for over 20 percent of China’s rare earths feedstock in 2009, that figure had dropped to just 3 percent by the early 2020s. UK's Chatham House estimates that in 2021, rare earths exports from Myanmar to China totaled USD $812 million, up from a mere USD $1.5 million in 2014.
COVID and flooding in 2020 slowed exports, but they rebounded strongly the following year for a very different reason.
Following the coup d’etat in Myanmar in February 2021, state authorities in Chipwe, the regional center, ceased functioning. Without the burden of administrative oversight, local miners with connections to BGF could now boost production. Chinese-owned companies could deal with BGF as a “one-stop shop” to obtain an exploration license. Bilingual brokers facilitated this process. Which they did. Institute for Strategy and Policy – Myanmar reported that 135 new mining sites opened that year, compared to just 12 in 2020. However, new mining operations were also initiated in areas under KIA's control further south. That was the case in the Bhamo District, especially in the regions close to China’s border, even though the permitting process was more fraught there than in Chipwe. Other districts also saw a rapid increase in rare earth mining sites since 2021. Across the border regions, activity slowed down somewhat in 2022 but flourished again in 2023. This intense mushrooming of operations is not necessarily additive. According to some reports, the average life of a leaching operation spans three years, which is on par with the typical lifespan of a Chinese SME. But at some point, two thousand operations peppered the anthills of eastern Kachin with ISL boreholes.
Myanmar now accounts for 25% of China-bound tonnage. What is more impressive is that the trade was responsible for 50% of the value of all cross-border flows that the world’s #1 producer swallowed in 2024. This gap illustrates how “heavy” these exports were – rich in dysprosium, terbium, lutetium, gadolinium, and yttrium, precisely the elements whose exports have been all but banned by the PRC since April. By comparison, China’s rare earth imports from California accounted for 31% of the total tonnage clearing customs but only 10% of the total dollar value.
In September 2023, mining operations in the Pangwa region of Kachin were shut down “for inspection,” initially with no reopening date provided. Then, in late September 2024, KIA launched a successful offensive against BGF. On October 2, KIA captured the key rare earth-producing towns of Chipwe and Hsawlaw, after which KIA overwhelmed several BGF battalions. By November, the entire “Special Region-1” was under KIA’s control, including both Pangwa and Chipwe.
Beijing was squeamish about contacts with the group, though Indian go-betweens had fewer misgivings. What followed sent shudders through Zhongnanhai. Rare earth imports from Myanmar dropped sharply. KIA demanded a 20% "service fee" from China Rare Earth Group, an SOE consolidated by China's SASAC. Negotiations failed, and exports of mixed oxides crashed from nearly five tonnes in September 2024 to less than one tonne in December. One wonders if Beijing's decision to slap export restrictions this spring was by any chance related to nervousness regarding erratic heavy oxide supplies. In that, it would be a repeat of the Senkaku episode in 2010.
But in April, shipments from ASEAN's problem child rebounded to September levels. KIA had apparently agreed to export mixed oxide, albeit taxed at a hefty premium.
That would squeeze the margins of oxide separators in the PRC. Now, however, Reuters has reported that Chinese-related entities have begun rare earth extraction further south, on the hillsides of Shan state, to the East from the river valleys of Chindwin and Irrawaddy. This region has so far been known for its production of antimony, tin-tungsten, and zinc-lead-silver. The rare earth belt crosses further southeast into northern Laos, where Fujian-based Xiamen Tungsten is now active.
The mines in Shan operate under the protection of a different armed group: the United Wa State Army (UWSA). The 30,000-strong UWSA controls Wa State, a carve-out of Shan State in northeastern Myanmar, which enjoys de facto autonomy from the central government. It maintains close ties with China, which provides the group with weapons. UWSA has largely maintained a neutral stance in the ongoing civil war in Myanmar.
UWSA already controls one of the world's largest tin mines. Now, they are adding rare earths to the portfolio. No listing plans in Hong Kong?
SUPPLY CHAIN OBSERVATIONS
CHINESE LITHIUM RUNS LOSSES TO DEFEND SHARE; WESTERN MINERS UNDER PRICE SQUEEZE
Three years into the lithium slump, this bear feels a bit less cuddly than in its previous incarnation of 2018-2019. Back then, producers cut, suspended, mothballed, shut down, postponed, or maintained lithium projects without much care. Wodgina, Kemerton, Greenbushes, Bald Hill, and Mt Holland were trimmed, deferred, or went into administration. Meanwhile, Ganfeng and Zijin went…shopping.
So, this time, the story feels very different. For political and technical reasons, Chinese lithium producers are not cutting production, and those that did were politely (?) asked to cease and desist. Obsessed with dominance in the cathode sector, the “Chinese” continue to produce below cost. CATL resumed loss-making lepidolite operations in Jiangxi and remains the most heavily subsidized entity in the sector. New lithium supply has recently come online in Mali, with both Bougouni and Goulamina mines under Chinese control.
So, in the interest of protecting their already dwindling market share, Albemarle or Mineral Resources are unlikely to cut production this time. The result: a much more protracted price agony.
During the quarter, Albemarle estimated that about 40% of global supply capacity is either “at or below” breakeven, and about a third has been idled. The North Carolina-based company suggested that a price of USD $13,000/t for lithium carbonate equivalent (approximately 30% above the current spot) would be necessary to incentivize doubling global production from 1.2mt in 2024 to 2.5mt by 2030 to meet the projected demand.
Some companies can make money at the current prices, so the problem is capex intensity, not future operations. At Thacker Pass in Nevada, Lithium Americas’ forecasted C1 opex is expected to be USD $6,300/t, and C3 costs USD $7,500/t. General Motors, Lithium Americas' only Phase One customer, agreed to this price floor, as required by the Department of Energy's Loan Programs Office, to ensure "reasonable-prospect-of-repayment."
In this context, it is worth reviewing how lithium prices behaved throughout the quarter. Let’s have a look at carbonate prices first. Chinese prices entered the quarter on a downtrend, with bearish sentiment and market uncertainty sparked by tariff-led trade tensions. In early April, Platts assessed battery-grade lithium carbonate at around CNY ¥73,200/t (delivered duty paid in China), equivalent to USD $10,200/t. This was a slight improvement over the USD $9,520/t average lithium carbonate price in March. Yet volumes were strong. China's lithium carbonate imports reached a record high of 28,336t in April, up 56.3% MoM and 33.6% YoY, driven by increasing inflows from Argentina and Chile.
In May, battery-grade lithium carbonate fell to CNY ¥66,500/t on a DDP China basis. There were reports of a decline in lithium demand, especially from the energy storage system sector and certain LFP battery orders. Some observers anticipated a 10% drop in lithium iron phosphate, commonly used in energy storage systems. This flies in the face of popular projections for battery storage installations rising from 160GWh in 2023 to over 1TWh by 2030. At 0.75kg LCE per kWh, this would equal 750kt of lithium, around 62% of the entire market in 2024. The market does not care when there is Mali, Zim, and soon maybe DRC.
We saw a further decline in lithium carbonate futures contract prices on the Guangzhou Futures Exchange. On May 20, carbonate prices fell to a more-than-four-year-low of CNY ¥61,000/t (USD $8,505/t) amid slow spot activity. While some lithium converters in China either cut or stopped production because of negative profit margins, upstream brine lithium producers and spodumene miners continued to ramp up production. Following pauses in 2024, lepidolite miners in Jiangxi (not only CATL) have also resumed production, and this source now represents a breathtaking 45% of the domestic production. The overall downtrend, high inventory levels, and expectations of further declining domestic lithium carbonate prices kept buyers in a wait-and-see mode. In this climate, consolidation continued. Always on the lookout for new acquisition targets, Zijin Mining Group scooped a 26.2% stake in Tibet Zangge Mining, a miner of lithium brines (and copper).
By the end of May, Guangzhou Future Exchange flashed prices for lithium carbonate at CNY ¥60,000/t (USD $8,366/t). Some local market participants expected the absolute bottom to be around CNY ¥55,000/t (USD $7,670/t). Despite the price drop in Asia, European prices were largely stable at around USD $8,500/t CIF for battery-grade lithium hydroxide and carbonate. However, inventories remained high.
At the beginning of June, Chinese lithium carbonate prices edged higher amid signs that government policies raising coal costs and electricity prices had driven up production costs of industrial commodities. This was viewed as yet another government policy to promote electric vehicles. For a moment, prices ticked upward before sliding again in late June to CNY ¥59,000/t on a DDP China basis (USD $8,226/t).
What about hydroxide? China's lithium hydroxide exports fell to 4,222mt in April, down 0.9% MoM and 61% YoY, led by declining outflows to South Korea and Japan. In early April, battery-grade lithium hydroxide was priced at CNY ¥65,500/t DDP China (USD $9,133/t), but it fell to CNY ¥62,500/t on May 9. Lithium hydroxide resumed a hesitant premium over carbonate for the first time in several years. The prices remained supported in China as producers rather than traders held most of the domestic inventory. However, the main reason for the reappearance of its fleeting premium may have been the relative illiquidity of the contract compared to carbonate. At the end of May, Chinese lithium hydroxide stood at CNY ¥63,000/t DDP China (USD $8,784/t), but there were no spot deals, and prices eased again throughout June. Towards the end of the quarter, battery-grade lithium hydroxide was reported at around CNY ¥ 57,500/t DDP China (USD $8,017/t), returning to discount to carbonate. In the European market, the Chinese offer for lithium hydroxide was quoted in the low USD $9,000s/t CIF, with anything between USD $8,000-9,000/t subject to negotiations.
Buying interest for mined spodumene waned, too. Volume-wise, you wouldn’t guess it, as China’s imports of spodumene reached 622,898t in April, up 16.5% from March. Australia was the largest supplier to China, with shipments totaling 297,704t, accounting for 47.8% of the country’s total imports. Price-wise, it's a different story. Platts assessed spodumene concentrate with 6% lithium oxide content at USD $795/t FOB Australia. It had been over six months since the introduction of a 6% spodumene futures contract (cash-settled) by the CME Group, assessed on a CIF China basis. We do not yet see how the market has been affected by this. In May, Australian 6% spodumene concentrate fell again and hovered around USD $750-760/t CIF China (this translates into approximately USD $720-730/t on a FOB Australia basis). The sentiment was so bearish that many Chinese buyers were now sitting on the sidelines or seeking prices below USD $700/t CIF China. Later in May, a second-hand trade of 8kt of Brazil-origin spodumene was concluded at USD $600/t on a SC5.2 CIF China basis (equivalent to around USD $692/t on a CIF China basis for 6% spodumene concentrate). Offers of Australian-origin spodumene attracted bids below USD $700/t on an SC6 CIF China basis, with USD $680/t FOB Australia.
Those were the days! During the second half of the quarter, spodumene from Australia fell to USD $600-USD $640/t on a CIF China SC6 basis, equivalent to around USD $570-USD $610/t on a FOB Australia SC6 basis, which is now close to September 2021 lows. In June, the anemic rebound in lithium carbonate prices contributed to a slight increase in spodumene prices. Still, miners were already facing inventory pressures, prompting some to consider selling at lower prices. Apparently, even Chinese miners would face selling pressure if prices fell below USD $600/t. Towards the end of the month, prices were reported in the range of USD $600-$630/t (CIF China SC6 basis), equivalent to around USD $570-$600/t FOB Australia, but there were rumors of Australian feedstock falling even below USD $600/t CIF China. However, no deals were reported at such abysmal levels. Yet?
The third quarter should be challenging as more producers may announce losses for Q2, fueling expectations of supply curtailments.
MINING & EXPLORATION NEWS
US- and Canadian-listed Perpetua (formerly Midas Gold) is shaking the tin cup for a fresh USD $425 million equity raise, bumped up from its original USD $400 million target. The money will help fund the Stibnite gold-antimony project in Idaho. The raise includes a USD $300 million bought deal, plus a USD $100 million private placement courtesy of Paulson & Co. The cash will go toward the equity portion of project financing (it’s a big capex ticket). Perpetua also filed an application for up to USD $2 billion in project debt from the U.S. Export-Import Bank (EXIM) back in May 2025. EXIM is currently poking through the numbers in due diligence, with any loan conditional on that process wrapping up nicely and on Perpetua closing this equity round first. Debt funding is expected to land sometime in 2026, assuming all goes to plan. In parallel, the company is trying to lock down a USD $155 million guarantee and indemnification package for the hefty reclamation bonds tied to its federal and state permits. Final permits are slated for 2025. On top of all that, Perpetua is chasing another USD $200–250 million via a net smelter royalty (capped at 3.9%) or a gold stream, with a buy-back clause in the mix. The latest feasibility study pegs the project at 4.8 million ounces of reserves grading 1.43 g/t, with an average production of ~460,000 ounces per year in the first four years. This project has been around, like, forever, but there is always hope for late bloomers.
After a long bureaucratic slog, the Swedish government has officially dismissed all remaining appeals against ASX-listed Talga’s Nunasvaara South natural graphite mine. That puts the final stamp on the Exploitation Concession, which is now entirely in force. Shareholders? The stock jumped 20% before giving it all away. It's graphite, after all. Heavy. Back in April 2024, Talga updated its FEED study. The estimated capex for the anode refinery is EUR €560 million, plus a working capital buffer (EUR €40 million?). All this for a 19.5ktpa anode facility. So far, they’ve locked in EUR €150 million in debt from the European Investment Bank, plus a EUR €70 million grant. That still leaves a funding gap of about EUR €140 million in debt and EUR €240 million in equity, assuming a tidy 60/40 debt-equity split. That heavy lifting is keeping the share prices under pressure. Last year, Talga teased us with a monster expansion scenario in an interim scoping study: ramping mine throughput to 2 million tonnes per annum to produce roughly 425ktpa of anode precursor. That would make it a giant in the anode world, though this would still be only good for ~4% of the global anode demand forecast of 10.6 million tonnes by 2030. Just the mine side of that vision could cost EUR €1 billion, with more capital needed downstream. The Phase 1 DFS covers just 2.3Mt of resource. But a JORC Exploration Target is looming behind it, estimated at 240–350Mt grading 20–30% Cg. The planned refinery in Luleå will be fed by the Nunasvaara mine and is expected to crank out 19.5ktpa of anode material. With all major permits now secured for both the mine and refinery, Talga can finally move beyond the paperwork and into the dirt.
More Sweden. Western Australian company Alkane Resources announced that its merger with Mandalay Resources has received regulatory approval in Sweden, allowing the transaction to proceed under Swedish law. However, the deal still faces several hurdles: it is subject to approvals from the Supreme Court of British Columbia, FIRB approval in Australia, and final shareholder approvals expected in late July 2025. Mandalay has operated a gold-antimony Costerfield mine in central Victoria, a major Western source of refractory ore. Under the proposed “merger of equals,” Mandalay shareholders will get 7.875 Alkane shares for each Mandalay share held, representing a modest 2% premium to the target's last close. Post-deal, Mandalay's and Alkane's shareholders will own 55% and 45% of the combined entity, respectively. The new company will keep its primary listing on the ASX with a secondary spot on the TSX. Once inked, the merged entity will boast an implied market cap of around AUD $1.013 billion and a consolidated March quarter exit cash balance of AUD $188 million, net cash of AUD $128 million after accounting for liabilities. Post-merger, Alkane would be 160–180koz per annum AuEq producer but with strategic antimony exposure.
London-listed Pensana has been busy collecting MOUs like baseball cards. The latest? A handshake with American Resources and its critical mineral refining arm, the chromatography enfant terrible: ReElement Technologies. ReElement's deep familiarity with southern Africa makes this development surprising: the deal proposes an offtake of up to 20 ktpa of mixed rare-earth carbonate from Angola's Longonjo project over a five-year term, with pricing still to be determined. This follows hot on the heels of the recent MOU with Toyota Tsusho Corp for the exact same terms: 20ktpa over five years, with pricing (again) to be ironed out later. Not to be outdone by the Japanese automotive juggernaut, back in September 2024, Pensana also inked an MOU with Hanwa, another Japanese trader, for, yes, up to 20ktpa of MREC over five years. Pricing? It is still up for discussion. According to a June 23 release, the latest MOU is part of a broader ambition to establish a “sustainable, independent“ rare earth supply chain in the US. Pensana's strategy is clear: lockdown long-term buyers, then build the supply chain from Longonjo to wherever the highest bidder is. So far, they’ve got interest. Now comes the execution. Are there any plans for those radionuclides there? Just asking.
Two ASX-listed players, Meteoric Resources and MTM Critical Metals, have teamed up under a non-binding MOU to evaluate downstream processing of Meteoric’s Caldeira mixed rare earth carbonate (MREC) using MTM’s proprietary “Flash Joule Heating” (FJH) technology, which Rice University developed. FJH was previously successfully used to recover high-grade antimony. This collaboration builds successful proof-of-concept test work, aiming to assess the technical and commercial feasibility of integrating FJH into Meteoric’s processing flowsheet. The deal includes sharing data and shaping commercial terms over the next 12 months. MTM’s Flash Joule Heating is an electrothermal process that rapidly heats ore and waste streams, selectively separating metals. Early pilot tests show FJH could shake up conventional hydrometallurgy and pyrometallurgy by boosting metal recoveries, slashing energy and chemical use, and speeding up processing times. In recent tests on Caldeira’s MREC, something remarkable happened. FJH raised the magnetic rare earth oxide (REO) content from ~30% to 72% of total rare earth oxides (TREO). Key rare earths like (neodymium) and the heavies (dysprosium and terbium) saw substantial recoveries: 65-75% for NdPr and around 80% for Dy/Tb.
Meanwhile, low-value lanthanum and cerium were mainly removed, improving the quality and potential payability of the final product. If further scaled test work confirms the promising results (and costs), This FJH could unlock a valuable new processing and marketing avenue for Meteoric’s MREC. Commercial options on the table include technology licensing, toll treatment, or offtake agreements with MTM. Notably, MTM has agreed not to apply FJH to any other third-party rare earth clay projects in Brazil without Meteoric’s consent, underscoring the exclusivity of this collaboration. Here is why it's worth watching it in the future. Dysprosium content in TREO increased from 0.70% to 1.68%, lanthanum content decreased dramatically from 59.6% to 6.56%, while yttrium content increased from 4.5% to 13.32%. Neodymium content nearly doubled from 21% to 48.44%. This could translate into better product payability, lower downstream processing costs, and overall improved economics for Meteoric’s rare earth supply chain. Too good to be true? But if this is true and scalable, the outcome would be massive. The market barely noticed while MTM's stock went flying.
US-listed Critical Metals Corp (not to be confused with ASX-listed MTM Critical Metals, above), infamous for its raise earlier this year, has somehow managed to convince the US Export-Import Bank to offer a non-binding Letter of Intent for a potential loan of up to USD $120 million, featuring a 15-year repayment schedule. Really? The financing would support the development of the Tanbreez rare earths project in Greenland. Critical Metals holds 42% interest in this project, with European Lithium owning 7.5%. European Lithium controls approximately 68% of Critical Metals. The company has an option to increase its stake to 92.5% by investing an additional USD $10 million. A 2016 Mineral Resource Estimate (MRE) indicated ~45 million tonnes at 0.38% total rare earth oxides (TREO), with about 27% heavy rare earth elements (HREE). The primary REE mineral is eudialyte, which is nigh-on un-mineable. Critical Metals also owns the Wolfsberg Lithium Project in Austria, currently at the feasibility study stage, with ~12 million tonnes at 0.64% Li2O in underground reserves and ~13 million tonnes at 1.00% Li2O in total resources.
US Exim is on a roll. TSX-listed Giyani Metals has also received a Letter of Intent from the US Export-Import Bank, beating Tabreez on the quantum: it’s for up to USD $225 million in long-term debt financing to support the construction of its K. Hill battery-grade manganese project in Botswana. The proposed facility would carry a repayment term of up to 15 years. The funding is subject to Giyani securing offtake agreements with U.S.-based companies. Giyani is developing a proprietary hydrometallurgical process to produce High-Purity Manganese Sulphate Monohydrate (HPMSM) and High-Purity Manganese Oxide (HPMO) key cathode precursor materials for lithium-ion batteries used in EVs and energy storage systems (ESS). The company has initiated offtake discussions and is progressing toward completing a feasibility study by Q1 2026. Patience is golden here.
Here's an intriguing one. London-listed Rainbow Rare Earths has commenced work on an economic assessment for the Uberaba rare earth recovery project from phosphate tailings in Minas Gerais, Brazil, in collaboration with Mosaic, the world’s leading producer of phosphate and potash crop nutrients. The project targets the recovery of rare earth elements from ~4.3 million tonnes per annum of phosphogypsum tailings (yuk!) generated at Mosaic’s Uberaba phosphoric acid plant. Note that these tailings are at least twice the size of Rainbow’s Phalaborwa rare earths project in South Africa. A preliminary flowsheet for rare earth extraction was developed by Mosaic “with Rainbow’s support.” Assays on Uberaba tailings show grades ranging from 0.45% to 0.79% TREO, with an average of ~0.58% TREO. The rare earth content includes approximately 24.5% high-value magnet elements (Nd, Pr) and what was described as "meaningful" concentrations of heavies (dysprosium and terbium). Most of the rare earth elements are contained in the phosphate slurry feed. Uberaba also produces ~1,000 tonnes of monoammonium phosphate (MAP) per annum and ~1,100 tonnes of triple superphosphate (TSP). Two processing modules treating ~2.15mtpa each, for a total of ~4.3mtpa, approximately twice the scale of Phalaborwa. A single hydrometallurgical plant is planned on site to produce SEPARATED oxides (!) at +99% purity. The chemically cleaned phosphogypsum residue will be returned to Mosaic’s facility. The initial project life is 15 years, though the Uberaba plant is expected to operate much longer. The estimated cost of the assessment is a mere USD $230,000, split equally between Rainbow and Mosaic. As we know, Rainbow is also working on test work in South Africa for the Phalaborwa residues with Mincon. The team is focused on refining the leaching, ion exchange, precipitation, and separation circuits. It contains a primary leaching circuit to recover rare earths into solution and a CIX (continuous ion exchange) system to reduce impurities and produce clean feedstock for final separation. We have yet to hear how they plan to achieve the separation in Minas Gerais.
Perth-based Encounter Resources has fired up the aircore (AC) rigs to test fresh carbonatite targets at its 100%-owned Aileron project in the West Arunta region (east-central WA, just a boomerang's throw away from the border of Northern Territory). That brings the active rig count to two, with reverse circulation (RC) drilling already underway to expand on the initial niobium resource (19.2Mt @ 1.74% Nb₂O₅ using a 1.0% cut-off). The first assays are expected to land in July. The regional AC program is a classic first-pass blitz, fast, cheap, and good for screening promising structural zones across a growing list of targets. Encounter is chasing not just niobium and rare earths but also copper prospects to the east. To feed the pipeline, the company is also prepping an airborne EM survey to overlay with regional magnetics from the Geological Survey of Western Australia, leveraging fresh geophysics to short-circuit the path to discovery. The bottom line is that with rigs now spinning on both RC and AC fronts, Encounter may finally try to crack open a new discovery or two in the broader West Arunta district. Share price year-on-year? It looks like it was built for ski jumping.
ASX-listed (and Louisiana-serving) Syrah Resources has officially resumed operations at its Balama graphite mine in Mozambique. The restart follows the restoration of site access in May 2025, with teams completing remobilization, inspections, maintenance, and all the usual pre-start checks. Production had been suspended since September 2024 due to a cocktail of weak demand for fines and local unrest, namely protests led by displaced farmers, which were later swept up in broader tensions surrounding Mozambique’s national elections. With the dust settling (somewhat), Syrah is taking a measured approach to ramp-up, aiming to build momentum ahead of a breakbulk graphite shipment slated for the September quarter, targeting customers outside China. Force majeure, however, remains in place for now, pending shipment resumption and a clearer picture of the political and logistical landscape. In short, Balama’s breathing again, but it looks like they’re keeping one hand on the emergency brake.
Viridis has filed its Environmental Impact Assessment (EIA) and full Environmental Impact Report for the Colossus project, ticking the first major box in its application for a preliminary license (LP). Colossus will follow Brazil’s three-stage permitting gauntlet: Preliminary License (LP), Installation License (LI), and finally, the Operating License (LO). The paperwork was submitted to the Minas Gerais State Environmental Agency and covers the tenements within the Northern Concessions. The company has also secured a Certificate of Regularity for Land Use and Occupation from the Municipality of Poços de Caldas, effectively the local government’s official stamp of approval. This document is a crucial precondition for advancing the LP and signals that the Colossus project has solid political tailwinds at the municipal level.
Meanwhile, Viridis and its JV partner Ionic Rare Earths, through their joint vehicle Viridion, are looking beyond Brazil, with plans to stake a claim in the US refining game. An updated scoping study evaluating MREC processing strategies in both Brazil and the US is slated for the second half of this year. Adding to the momentum, Viridis was recently selected under Brazil’s headline-grabbing USD $1.4 billion Strategic Minerals Program, led by state development banks BNDES and FINEP.
ASX-listed Galan Lithium, the developer of the Hombre Muerto West brine project in Argentina's Catamarca province, has just scooped AUD $20 million by selling shares at a juicy 21% above the previous day's close. Existing shareholder Clean Elements gets a sweetener, too: one unlisted option for every two shares, exercisable at AUD $0.15. Clean Elements are part of a Swiss wealth management group. The fresh cash will lock in the final construction funds for Phase 1 of Hombre Muerto West, which aims to crank out 4ktpa of lithium carbonate equivalent (LCE), with the first chloride shipments expected in the first half of 2026. Galan still has ambitious plans to scale production to a hefty 60ktpa LCE.
A year and a half after its foxy move on (the old diamond) Renard plant, ASX-listed lithium hopeful Winsome isn’t feeling like it will exercise the option on the current terms. The company admitted that it is unlikely to pull the trigger by August 2025 unless the lithium market suddenly gets friendlier (which has not been the case lately; see the Supply Chain Developments section above). That said, if things improve down the line, and only if (former operator) Stornoway decides not to rehab the site, Winsome might dust off Renard and take another look. Meanwhile, Winsome still sits on a comfy AUD $18.7 million in cash.
Nevada-focused and Dublin-based explorer Great Western Mining has reported promising assay results from its Pine Crow and Defender tungsten projects following a recent reconnaissance sampling campaign across their expanded claims. Selective grab samples revealed impressive tungsten trioxide (WO3) grades, including 1.75% WO3. These results reveal a mineralized trend stretching 1.2km, with the Pine Crow and Defender workings located at either end. Notably, scheelite-bearing skarns have been identified, enhancing the prospects for high-grade tungsten mineralization. For context, previous highs at these prospects were 0.33% WO3 at Pine Crow and 0.2% WO3 at Defender, making the new results a significant step up. Management intends to advance towards defining drill targets and launching a drilling program to test the tungsten potential further. China currently controls 85-95% of global tungsten processing capacity.
Melbourne-based Atlantic Tin has announced an extension of the offer period for the recommended AUD $98 million acquisition offer from Inner Mongolia Xingye Silver and Tin Mining. The Chinese company holds the Achmmach tin mine in Morocco (formerly Kasbah Resources) and recently expanded its footprint by acquiring the nearby El Hammam mine from Managem in August 2024. The plan involves processing tin ore from Achmmach using the established two-stage crushing, milling, flotation, thickening, and filtering infrastructure at El Hammam, which also benefits from existing power and water supply. Production is targeted to commence in 2026, ramping up to a sustained mining and processing rate of 900,000 tonnes per annum of ore, based on a DFS envisioning an 18-month construction period.
London-listed Zinnwald Lithium has raised GBP £3.2 million through the issue of approximately 63 million new shares at 5p per share. The company is developing a project in the Erzgebirge region of East Germany, not far away from the charming city of Dresden. The placing price represents a discount of approximately 9% to the closing mid-price on Monday. The 2025 pre-feasibility study estimates a hefty EUR €1.0 billion development cost for an integrated lithium hydroxide facility. Phase 1 production is targeted at 18,000 tonnes of lithium hydroxide per annum (tpa), rising to 35,000 tonnes per annum in Phase 2. The project forecasts a post-tax NPV8 of €2.2bn and an IRR of approximately 20%, based on a lithium hydroxide price of EUR €26,000/tonne. This thing was bypassed in the recent listings of priority projects by the EU’s Critical Raw Materials Act.
SOURCES: (1) Market Data from Bloomberg as of 9:00 AM ET, June 26, 2025, in the local currency. (2) Additional data courtesy of Albemarle Corporation (ALB US), Alkane Resources Ltd (ALK AU), American Resources Corporation (AREC US), Atlantic Tin (private company), CATL (Contemporary Amperex Technology Co., Ltd.) (300750 CH), China Rare Earth Group Co., Ltd. (769 HK), Clean Elements (private company), Critical Metals Corp. (CRML US), Encounter Resources Ltd (ENR AU), European Lithium Ltd (EUR AU), Galan Lithium Limited (GLN AU), Ganfeng Lithium Co., Ltd. (002460 CH), General Motors Company (GM US), Giyani Metals Corp. (EMM CN), Great Western Mining Corporation plc (GWMO LN), Inner Mongolia Xingye Silver and Tin Mining Co., Ltd. (000436 CH), Ionic Rare Earths Limited (IXR AU), Lithium Americas Corp. (LAC US), Mandalay Resources Corporation (MND AU), Meteoric Resources NL (MEI AU), Mineral Resources Limited (MIN AU), Mosaic Company (MOS US), MTM Critical Metals Limited (MTM AU), Paulson & Co. Inc. (private company), Pensana plc (PRE LN), Perpetua Resources Corp. (PPUA US), Rainbow Rare Earths Limited (RBW LN), Stornoway Diamond Corporation (SWYDF US), Syrah Resources Ltd (SYR AU), Talga Group Ltd (TLG AU), Tibet Zangge Mining Co., Ltd. (private company), Toyota Motor Corporation (7203 JT), Viridis Mining and Minerals Limited (VMM AU), Winsome Resources Ltd (WR1 AU), Xiamen Tungsten Co., Ltd. (600549 CH), Zijin Mining Group Co., Ltd. (2899 HK), and Zinnwald Lithium plc (ZNWD LN).
DISCLAIMER: No statements made in third-party links to this email should be interpreted as legal, accounting, investment, or tax advice. Amvest Capital Group Holdings LLC and together with its direct and indirect subsidiaries and affiliates (“Amvest Capital”) may describe, reference, or provide links, in its sole discretion, to other information or products or sites on the World Wide Web for the convenience of users in locating related information and services. Amvest Capital assumes no liability for the content of any linked sites, including, without limitation, the accuracy, subject matter, quality, or timeliness of the information. Any such information has not necessarily been thoroughly reviewed by Amvest Capital and is provided or maintained by third parties over which Amvest Capital exercises no control. In addition, to the extent that they were reviewed by Amvest Capital, Amvest Capital takes no responsibility for continually monitoring such sites; the material at a site when Amvest Capital viewed it may differ materially from when you do. Accordingly, Amvest Capital expressly disclaims any responsibility for the content, the accuracy of the information, and/or the quality of products or services provided by or advertised on these third-party sites.
This is neither an offer to sell nor a solicitation of an offer to buy interests in any entity managed by Amvest Capital, any related entity, or any other security nor shall there be any sale of securities in any state or jurisdiction in which such offer or solicitation or sale would be unlawful prior to registration or qualification under the laws of such state or jurisdiction. This contains certain statements that may include "forward-looking statements". All statements, other than statements of historical fact, included herein are "forward-looking statements." Included among "forward-looking statements" are, among other things, statements about the company’s future outlook on opportunities based upon current market and survey conditions. Although Amvest Capital believes that the expectations reflected in these forward-looking statements are reasonable, they do involve assumptions, risks, and uncertainties, and these expectations may prove to be incorrect. Actual results could differ materially from those anticipated in these forward-looking statements as a result of a variety of factors. One should not place undue reliance on these forward-looking statements, which speak only as of the date of this discussion. Other than as required by law, the company does not assume a duty to update these forward-looking statements.